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ABSTRACT

This collection of four articles on issues in social education in Australia begins with "Global and Nationalistic Education in International Perspective" (J. L. Nelson). The article discusses the nationalistic viewpoint of citizenship education, its place in the social sciences, the role of history instruction, and the divergent view of global education taught through world history, comparative studies, international relations, and foreign policy studies. The second article, "National Initiatives in Social Education in Australia" (K. J. Kennedy) presents some current education initiatives of the Curriculum Development Centre (Australia) and the future of social education in the Australian curriculum. The 1984 Beazley recommendations for social education curriculum planners is the focus of "Implications of the Beazley Report for Social Education in Western Australia" (B. Wells), and the article reports that the recommendations indirectly upgrade social education programs in schools. The fourth article, "Critical Issues in Moral Values Education" (R. A. Wilkins) discusses the problem of teaching moral values and selecting which values to include, L. Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach, and seven guidelines for curriculum development. (DJC)

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ISSUES IN SOCIAL EDUCATION

Edited by Gilbert McDonald and Barry J. Fraser
Western Australian Institute of Technology

Monograph in the Faculty of Education Research
Seminar and Workshop Series

Western Australian Institute of Technology

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FOREWORD

This publication is the seventh in the series based on papers presented at the Research Seminar and Workshop Series offered by the Faculty of Education at the Western Australian Institute of Technology (WAIT).

Each seminar/workshop, which focuses on educational research of international significance, is held at WAIT and is open to educational researchers and practitioners from other institutions and the State Department of Education. As well, WAIT publishes the proceedings in order to make the series widely accessible to national and international audiences.

The contents of each of the six monographs is overviewed below:

Classroom Management (edited by Barry J. Fraser). This research seminar held in August 1983 included a key address by **David Berliner** from the University of Arizona and papers by Kenneth Tobin, Barry Fraser, Richard Coatney and John Williamson. (Cost: $5)

Assessment of Classroom Psychosocial Environment: Workshop Manual (by Barry J. Fraser and Darrell L. Fisher). This research workshop in October 1983 was a repeat of a workshop presented successfully at the Annual Meeting of the National Association for Research in Science in Teaching in Dallas. It aimed to familiarize participants with a range of widely applicable scales designed to assess student perceptions of psychosocial characteristics of classroom environments. (Cost: $5)

Educational Evaluation for Program Improvement (edited by Anthony S. Ryan and Barry J. Fraser). This research seminar in November 1983 involved a key address by WilliamCooley of the University of Pittsburgh and papers by R. Straton and J. Osborne and Muredach Dynan. (Cost: $5)

Looking Into Classrooms (edited by David F. Treagust and Barry J. Fraser). This research seminar in September 1984 involved a key address by **James Gallagher** of Michigan State University and papers by L. Rennie, L. Parker and P. Hutchison, Kenneth Tobin and John Williamson. (Cost: $10)

Secondary Analysis and Large-Scale Assessments (edited by Barry J. Fraser and Kenneth Tobin). This research seminar in November 1984 involved a key address by **Wayne Welch** of the University of Minnesota and papers by Malcolm Rosier of the Australian Council for Educational Research and Cassandra Nixon. (Cost: $10)

Informal Learning of Science (edited by Muredach B. Dynan and Barry J. Fraser). This research seminar in March 1985 involved a key address by **Arthur Lucas** of Chelsea College of the University of London and papers by Renato Schibeci, John Webb and Tom Perrigo. (Cost: $10)

Issues in Social Education (edited by Gilbert McDonald and Barry J. Fraser). This research seminar in August 1986 involved a key address by **Jack Nelson** of Rutgers University and papers by Kerry Kennedy, Barry Wells and Robert Wilkins.

Any of the above monographs may be ordered by sending a cheque (either Australian or US currency) made payable to Research Seminar and Workshop Series to Faculty Secretary, Faculty of Education, Western Australian Institute of Technology, Bentley 6102, Australia.

Chapter 1

GLOBAL AND NATIONALISTIC EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

JACK L. NELSON*

Rutgers University

Educators in the United States and elsewhere have often found it useful and comforting to refer to John Dewey's works for support. This paper is no exception as it invokes Dewey's name as grounds for approaching this topic of global and nationalistic education by a somewhat circuitous route. I am not referring to Dewey's personal interests in international affairs, nor his extensive influence on educational thought throughout the world. Rather, I cite the small but significant work **How We Think** with its compelling concern for the nature and process of knowing (Dewey, 1933). Among the main points stressed by Dewey is that there are many ways of knowing, and the one process of inquiry he examines in some detail incorporates the identification of problems or issues and the need to consider definitions. The title of this monograph, **Issues in Social Education,** fits well into the problem-solving idea; and the circuitous route I plan to follow in exploring issues of global and nationalistic education leads through definitional terrain to set the issue in a context. Plainly put, I am an advocate of global education but not without criticism, and I am a critic of nationalistic education but not without recognizing some of its virtues. This requires some definition, some consideration of knowledge claims in social education, and some explanation.

ISSUES AND KNOWLEDGE

It is particularly appropriate to examine issues in social education at virtually any time; indeed, issues in social education could be a redundant term. The very nature of the field is issues - some trivial, some significant, some current, some historic, some clearly understandable, and some bewildering. In my own perception of the basic content of social education, controversy is an essential element. Social education necessarily incorporates issues, including the unresolved debate on the very nature of knowledge itself.

Knowledge is a human construct, subject to political, social, economic, historic, psychological, legal, anthropological, geographical, ideological, religious, philosophic and educational intervention and interpretation (Russell, 1961; Kuhn, 1970; Young, 1976). Each of these interpretations is a socially organized way of understanding and imparting knowledge. Attempts to produce, express, develop and alter knowledge are social activites, valid for certain periods of time and in certain locations, but not universal or everlasting. The production, expression, development and alteration of knowledge can be considered equivalent to science, language, education and progress. These are human inventions open to human review and redefinition. This is not to suggest that we actually know nothing, or to offer an extreme form of relativism, but to indicate that knowledge itself is a social issue open to study as proper social education. What we know, the structures of knowledge we use, and how we come to know are open to inquiry.

Karl Popper notes that "the phenomenon of knowledge is no doubt the greatest miracle in our universe. It constitutes a problem that will not soon be solved" (Popper, 1972, preface). Even mathematics, as Russell observed, is a "subject for which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true" (Russell, 1963, p. 56). And Myrdal remarked that "science is nothing but highly sophisticated common sense . . ." (Myrdal, 1969, p. 14). These comments do not denigrate scholarly work and they are obviously not anti-intellectual given their sources. Rather, they suggest a suitable level of tentativeness or skepticism about the truth claims of various forms of knowledge. That is, the comments are intellectual in the best sense, open to ideas and to re-examination. These comments also suggest the social context of knowledge, and the resulting opportunity for debate. Russell, arguing that knowledge is imprecise and conditioned by time and space, also put language into the sphere of social knowledge: "Language, our sole means of communicating scientific knowledge, is essentially

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* Professor Nelson was a Visiting Fellow in the Faculty of Education at the Western Australian Institute of Technology when this paper was delivered.

social in its origin and in its main functions" (Russell, 1961, p. 17). Kenneth Boulding (1966), recognizing an ominous side of the exploding work in developing social scientific knowledge, stated that "the rise of knowledge of social systems, however, has within it the seeds of their control...", yet he understood the civilizational need to continue the expansion of knowledge. In each of these statements about knowledge there is an issue, a controversy, and the substance of social education.

If the very foundations of social knowledge can be perceived as issues, then it would follow that the field of social education is based on issues. How can one define a field without knowledge? And, if knowledge is social, is it not subject to examination in social education? Further, except in the most severely limited definition of schooling which calls for the uncritical and uniform transmission of dogma to the young, the various definitions of social education require consideration of controversy.

SOCIAL STUDIES, SOCIAL EDUCATION AND OTHER TITLES

The terms we use to describe our field are worthy of consideration. Social studies, social science, history and the separate subjects, and social education are titles that connote various approaches to knowledge, curriculum, teaching materials and teacher education. Without labouring the definitions, we can posit some to assist in clarifying and exploring ideas in nationalistic and global education. Social studies, in the context of this paper, is the standard curriculum designation used in elementary and secondary schools in the United States. It is the title given to a group of courses which are separate from mathematics, science, English, arts, vocational education and other subjects. Social science is a term used to identify several specific subjects of study (e.g., political science, anthroplogy, economics, geography, psychology and sociology). There is some debate about the place of history in the social sciences; some believe history to be separate from them, others believe history is one of them, and some believe history is basic to them and all other subjects. There is a long tradition of domination of the social studies curriculum by history in the U.S., so history can be understood as another title often given to a collection of courses taught in schools and incorporating aspects of the humanities. Social studies, social sciences and history are often competitive titles for such curricula.

Social education is used herein as a more generic term which incorporates knowledge from the others, and also includes the broad concerns of social knowledge, social relations, social development and social improvement. Social education, in this form, goes beyond formal schooling and curricular practice to permit examination of such educational topics as science and society, ideology, critical theory and sociology of knowledge (Nelson & Michaelis, 1980; Nelson & Shaver, 1985).

Definitions are important in an examination of human ideas, since the defining qualities set boundaries which permit a level of clarity and understanding. Obviously, the boundaries are also limitations which restrict thought, but they are less onerous if subject to criticism and improvement. As will be argued, traditional definitions of social studies and history in the United States have restricted development of some characteristics of global education. Certain of these competing definitions of social studies render incompatible the curricular marriage of global studies and social studies in the U.S. The issue is of larger scale than that sentence represents. The difficulties lie in our differing perceptions of knowledge, education and values. The definition of social studies or social education I prefer incorporates critical thinking as a basic orientation and controversy as a basic substance (Dewey, 1933; Hunt & Metcalf, 1968).

NATIONALISTIC EDUCATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Differing rationales produce differing organizations of knowledge (scope and sequence) in the curriculum. The most traditional American view is that the social studies should inculcate an established set of data and values, predetermined outside of the field and acceptable in the dominant society. This view, often expressed as one form of citizenship education, holds that the good citizen is one who knows certain positive information about United States history and government, and is a loyal, supportive and obedient member of the national society. This definition of social studies and citizenship places the school as a location for the uncritical transmission of nationalistic material. The teacher's role is to present a select body of data and values from a socially acceptable point of view, and to evaluate whether it has been learned by students. The student's role is to adopt the values, comprehend the material, and be able to recite them in expected situations. The content of the material is value-laden answers; the process is inculcation. Thus, citizenship education in this form conveys a nationalistically biased orientation to knowledge, to values and to behaviours.

It is not an essential characteristic of citizenship education to be nationalistic, since citizenship can be defined in a number of ways including some revolutionary ones. But it is a common interpretation of the term by large segments of the public and by conservative elements of the educational establishment. Citizenship education is enjoying a rebirth of interest in the United States. Some scholars identify citizenship education as the core of the field, its primary purpose, separating it from social science education and from reflective inquiry (Barr, Barth & Shermis, 1977). Their work documents the historic

domination of social studies by "citizenship transmission", the conveyance of nationalism to the young through schooling.

There are some interesting historic parallels between the current citizenship movement and the earlier use of citizenship education as a substitute for social studies (1920s and 1950s), during times when nationalistic values were threatened by the "Red Scare" and the Cold War and when social studies was publicly challenged as "socialistic". For example, in the McCarthy period, New York State changed the title of its Division of Social Studies in the State Education Department to the Division of Citizenship Education. The title was changed back to social studies after McCarthyism had diminished in American society. The current rediscovery of citizenship education follows a period of challenge to nationalistic values (early post-Vietnam war) and a clearly conservative move in national and international politics. The threats of communism and loose morals to the minds of the young have spawned new public concern about social studies, and the field has responded with citizenship.

VALUES EDUCATION IN NATIONALISTIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Among the many victims of the return to the tradition of citizenship training as the basic learning in social studies has been the effort to develop more thoughtful values (ethical, moral) education approaches that occurred during the 1970s. The changed political climate, following a period of challenges to prevailing American social values, provided opportunity for the charges that schooling had become too liberal and too unstructured. Declines in college admission test scores and increasing student freedom in relation to drugs, sex and course selection were seen as symptomatic of moral malaise and educational malpractice. Values education, which had emerged late in the expansion of social studies work of the 1960s, was incorrectly perceived by some as among the responsible elements in the destruction of "American" values like family, privacy, loyalty and religion. It is obviously incorrect because values education actually had been little practiced in the schools and could not account for long-term changes in student lives. It was also incorrect since there are many types of values education, some in direct opposition to others, but it is still widely thought among teachers and the public that there is only one form.

Superka (1976) found nine distinct values education types, from absolutistic value inculcation through values inquiry and cognitive moral reasoning to relativistic values clarification. Yet, because of its comparative popularity, values clarification had become identified as typical of values education, and its moral relativism was condemned in many school districts with the result that values education is formally prohibited and teachers are now generally reluctant to practice or advocate it openly.

The national issue raised by MACOS (Man, A Course of Study), presumed by some to convey unAmerican values, caused a U.S. Congressional investigation into federal funding of school curriculum projects, a significant decrease in those national expenditures, and a general unwillingness of educators to deviate from socially approved mainstream curricular ideas. It also created the situation wherein MACOS materials, among the best social studies material developed, sit unused on school shelves for fear of public outcry.

Australia apparently experienced a similar episode regarding MACOS in Queensland where "the orientations of conservatism, regionalism and fundamentalism provided a fertile bed for the active growth of pressure groups" (Marsh, 1984, p. 211). The death of MACOS and the comatose condition of values education in the U.S. pose an interesting paradox in considering nationalistic citizenship education. Those who seek to eliminate values education from the schools are doing it in order to impose values (inculcation, in Superka's terms) on the young. In school districts where boards have forbidden values education, they still require identified national values to be demanded of teachers and students. The topic of moral values education has implications for nationalistic and global education. Indeed, values education, other than indoctrination, admits of the same diversity of views that is basic to the definition of social studies used here. Unfortunately, support for rational values inquiry has declined considerably in the U.S. as a result of pressure towards nationalistic values indoctrination in schools.

THE HISTORY CURRICULUM

Ironically, the traditional history approach to curriculum in the United States lends itself easily to this inculcation. Certainly, few historians of quality would argue that history is a body of truth which is intended to be ingested without criticism and to provide a set of moral precepts for the good citizen. Scholars in history recognize that history is interpretation, with divergent views, and open to critical examination. For a number of reasons, the translation of historians' works into basic history texts for schools has produced nationalistic, uncritical and bland courses in elementary and secondary schools suited to the narrow concept of American citizenship education. History texts used in American schools are notewrothy for their nationalistic bias, their air of truth, and their lack of vitality (Billington et al., 1966; Fitzgerald, 1979). The histories of all countries are nationalistic in some measure (Nietzche, 1957; Ridley, 1971); closed societies tend to be most restrictive in what they convey to youth in schools

about their national heritage. In a democratic society like the U.S., with a long tradition of anti-intellectualism, narrow political pressure on schools to produce "good" and loyal national citizens has had significant impact (Pierce, 1933; Beale 1936, 1941; Raup, 1936; Nelson, 1976, 1984).

The use of history to nationalize youth uncritically is certainly not unrecognized in Australia. I claim no extensive knowledge of Australian social education, but there are some old sources of information recommending changes in the Western Australian history curriculum in 1936 which state that "the glorification of our illustrious empire, the sorrowful mention of battles lost, the gleeful recounting of martial victories have, like other forms of braggadocio, come to be considered as rather bad form. A nobler and truer form of patriotism is that which finds expression in a high ideal standard of future conduct, not that which vaunts its past achievements" (Education Department of Western Australia, 1936, p. 139). This recognition could have altered the course of Australian history instruction; similar views have had limited impact on American curricular practice.

In schools in the United States, this nationalistic approach to social studies education is exemplified in a variety of ways. The separate states govern education, and in virtually all states there is a requirement that the Pledge of Allegiance to the American flag be given daily in schools. It took U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the early twentieth century to provide any exemption from this requirement, based on cases of Jehovah's Witnesses who argued that no national flag could demand allegiance above that of their religion. Schools across the country, however, still have flag salutes and other national rituals daily, despite the fact that few students below high school level understand the words they have memorized or the reaason for the activity. Students and teachers cannot be compelled to participate, but social pressure ensures the general practice. American flags fly over all schools, and the national anthem is the typical beginning of school assemblies and sports events. In contrast, although students in England show patriotic spirit, the English schools are not seen as the primary agents for transmitting nationalism.

In curricular terms, nationalistic citizenship education in the U.S. is expressed in state laws and school regulations requiring certain courses in all schools. The most required subject in all states is American history; the next is American government. The statutory rationales in establishing these requirements are similar across the states and include the need to produce patriotic citizens. These are twentieth century laws.

There is a long and unfortunate history of censorship, teacher dismissal, public condemnation, and myriad infractions of teacher freedom in schools on behalf of individuals and organizations committed to the most nationalistic of school curriculum (Sinclair, 1924; Beale, 1936, 1941). Current indications are that similar efforts at political restraint in schools are resurgent in America (Knight, 1985; see also the **Australian,** July 31, p. 14 and the May issue of the **Social Studies Professional).** These activities include legislative efforts to censor "secular humanism" in schools and to threaten teaching of controversial material. U.S. Senator Hatch has obtained amendments to national school financing legislation that provide for these restrictions. When the liberal group, Citizens for the American Way, publicized the highly restrictive content of the otherwise innocuous-sounding amendments, Senators who voted for them expressed shock at what they had approved. The conservative group, Eagle Forum, however, had acted on the basis of the law and already provided 250,000 copies of a sample letter that parents could use to threaten school principals **(Atlantic Monthly Magazine,** April 1985). The academic freedom of teachers once again is under serious attack in the U.S. It is my belief that conditions exist where another form of McCarthyism could arise. Do the social sciences offer less nationalistic emphasis for social studies curricula?

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE MYTH OF VALUE NEUTRALITY

In their attempt to emulate the physical sciences, social sciences adopted aspects of logical positivism which provided a mantle of value neutrality. This stance suggested that the search for truth in knowledge about society was not to be encumbered by moralistic strictures. While applied work in such areas as religion, law, social work and education was based on an ethical view of the improvement of the human condition, the social sciences would shed this orientation and operate as value-free sciences. This led easily to behaviourism and mathematical models on the premise that these do not convey values; they represent purity. In scholarly terms, these approaches have been useful in developing analytic tools, but they are certainly not value-free. Functionalism has been the dominant paradigm in this work, cloaking its prescriptive social morality and control in a presumption of truth-seeking (Gouldner, 1970; Adorno, 1973; Aronowitz, 1981; Besag & Nelson, 1984).

Curricular issues in the development of social sciences for teaching arise in American schools. There is a bifurcation in much social science education in which one strand utilizes a heavily moralistic orientation of the older forms of social science and the other strand presumes value neutrality drawn from current positivistic scholarship. The moralistic strand casts courses in psychology and sociology as educational answers to student problems in drugs, sex, vandalism and poor interpersonal relations. Economics and political science are taught to assist students to become good consumers and voters.

In the value-free strand, behaviouristic texts in psychology and sociology convey a sterile and non-human view of human activity where behavioural manipulation is assumed. Economics and political science are taught with graphs, charts and numbers as though they were not human enterprises. The most serious problem of the value-free strand is the infection of schools with behavioural objectives which serve to control and limit educational activities. Both strands, moralistic and value-free, serve the purposes of nationalistic education since they do not adapt easily to criticism, dissent or skeptical inquiry (Popkewitz, 1976; Giroux, 1979; Apple, 1982).

NATIONALISTIC APPROACHES TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Nationalistic citizen education in the U.S. is not limited to American history courses. Recent concern about "liberal" tendencies in the teaching of economics has led several state legislatures to enact laws requiring all students to take courses in free enterprise (Simon, 1979; Nelson & Carlson, 1981). These courses are not for the free discussion of economics, but are expressly intended to require students to understand one form of economic thought, presumed to be American.

In geography the standard orientation of world maps places the U.S. in the centre, splitting the Soviet Union. Geographic instruction, although it has suffered dramatic decline in the U.S., typically has been geo-political, with national boundaries the dominant concern. Most geographic study starts in the elementary school with a focus on local community, expanding to state and then nation. It seldom goes beyond that at the elementary level, since American history is the predominant subject starting at fifth grade. Where secondary schools undertake geography, the common approch is political geography ethnocentrically oriented to the U.S.

Political science, often taught as government or civics, is mainly devoted to descriptive and prescriptive study of the American governmental structure and ideals. The three branches of government, "how a bill becomes a law", and political history are the primary foci. There is relatively little on comparative government, and communism is still a subject which requires negative comment in schools. Florida, for example, requires a course titled "Americanism versus Communism" which demands that "Americanism" be shown as superior. Similar legal or regulatory strictures exist in several states to limit the free and open treatment of comparative political systems.

Other social sciences are not as commonly taught in the U.S., although many schools offer course work in psychology, sociology and anthroplogy, and some offer work in philosophy, religion and education in social science listings. These courses are not as obviously nationalistic, but there are examples of courses with titles like "American Sociological Thought" which mostly are taught from American social science perspectives.

HISTORICAL STUDY IN TEACHER EDUCATION

It should be noted that the vast majority of social studies teachers in the U.S. have degrees in American history and also might have picked up some background in social sciences. Thus, the typical teaching in social sciences is done by teachers well prepared in mainstream history and less well prepared in any one social science. This tends to impart an historical orientation to much of the study of social sciences in the schools. And the undergraduate program in history is devoted largely to courses which either survey large segments of history or provide highly detailed analyses of very short historic periods.

This program usually provides considerable data which are easily translated into material for teaching, but it seldom provides opportunity for history majors to undertake critical study of history and historians. Course work in philosophies of history and in historiography are generally reserved for graduate students aiming to be historians. Since the vast majority of social studies teachers are undergraduate history majors, they are not often in courses which give a critical or skeptical view. The result is that many social studies teachers have not read critical literature in history, social science or education. One could not expect such teachers to provide open inquiry into historical or social science material with which they have had no contact. This tends to reinforce the existing nationalistic bias in the basic texts and in the school setting.

The professional associations of social studies teachers also represent a mainstream view. For example, new sociology, critical theory and neo-Marxist critiques of curriculum and social education have had intellectual impact in Europe and the U.S. for about a decade (Young, 1976; Whitty, 1981; Giroux, 1979; Apple, 1979), yet the first issue of **Social Education,** the journal of the National Council for Social Studies, to treat these developments seriously has just appeared in May/June, 1985. And, as Stanley discovered in his extensive review of social studies literature over 20 years, social reconstructionism was virtually ignored over that long period (Stanley, 1979; 1981).

SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS OF NATIONALISTIC EDUCATION

It needs to be asserted that nationalistic education can be positive in some respects. Its positive intentions are to continue a set of social values meant to improve a society, to establish common links among members of a nation, to provide unifying ceremonies, rituals and understandings, and to integrate immigrants from a variety of nations. Democratic national ideals like equality, justice, liberty and the protection of human rights deserve preservation and development through education. Where nationalistic education supports and extols these ideals, it is positive.

Unfortunately, two major defects occur. Nationalistic education demands an interpretation which casts that nation-state as superior to others and which presents ideas considered contra-national as necessarily wrong. Secondly, nationalistic education usually does not condone or encourage dissent, and free societies depend upon the opportunity for dissenting views to be expressed and examined. In restricting dissent, censorship and political restraint are exhibited. In the former cases, where education is used by the nation-state to develop uncritical national patriotism and disdain for contra-national ideas, some of the most comprehensive forms of global education are denied to students. Knowledge is not perceived as tentative or subject to critique; and values are to be imposed, not examined.

DIVERGENT VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL EDUCATION

There are many approaches to international or global education. Several main approaches will be identified and described, but other category systems could be used.

World History

This approach is probably the most common separate curricular structure which some would call global education. I know of no adequate data on this subject, but contacts with colleagues in colleges and schools and examination of textbooks exhibited at national conferences would suggest that this title is more popular in schools than the titles which follow. It is also a reasonable assumption because of the high proportion of social studies teachers who have majors in history and would appreciate a historical approach to study of the world.

World history in the United States takes several forms, but there are some which dominate. The main idea is to study the histories of selected significant countries of the world, and many texts often include ancient history. The study is usually very western in interpretation and values. Ancient history is normally Hellenic; Western Europe is extensively treated; and America's high place in the world is a primary focus. In other words, it is an extension of nationalistic education into world history. There is an increasing interest in Asian, African and South American history, and these areas are being incorporated more into world history courses. Communist countries are often considered, but usually in a negative or sterile manner. The history work is devoted heavily to political and military history, with some examination of religions. Political geography, with nation-states as primary actors, and historical documents between ruling elites are expressed as representative of the period. There is often a presumption of linear development of civilizations culminating in western society. As in American history texts, there is little in the form of historical disputation or controversy.

Comparative Studies

Another popular approach to including non-United States material in social education is through comparative study of other nations. This is an approach often used in elementary and middle schools, where the curriculum has been modified to bring in "international or non-western" studies. A country, often in Asia, Africa or South America, is selected for relatively extensive study in contrast to life in the U.S. Some of these materials are remarkably well done, presenting a thoughtful and generally considerate view of several strata of people in that nation. Students can get a sense of life for children, workers, the unemployed, the well-to-do and others by examining these materials. They often draw from anthropological and sociological sources.

Other comparative study, however, bogs down in structural detail (e.g., political structure, imports and exports, population data, historical data on elites). This fails to convey a sense of social dynamics. And some material represents a very superficial approach which conveys simple stereotypes and other grossly inaccurate generalizations about life in other countries. This reinforces the American patriotism theme of nationalistic education, since it suggests a level of inferiority in non-American countries. Further, the focus is still on the nation-state.

International Relations

This approach is most often found in schools where teachers have some background in political science. Obviously, it can be taught from a historical orientation, and usually is, but the framework is from international political entities. Thus, political elites representing nation-states are the primary actors in this approach and study of political activities (e.g., treaties, national wars, diplomacy and

political boundaries) are important. Instruments of international contact like the UN, NATO and ANZUS are examined as means for national security and joint national development. The New International Economic Order, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are studied in terms of their national politics. The very term "international" conveys this orientation.

There is often an attempt at descriptive material which conveys a sense of value-free social science, but United States' interests figure heavily. Underlying this approach is an unstated assumption that nation-states will continue to dominate social existence. Despite the fact that nationalism is a recent phenomenon in human history, international relations are often taught in a manner that raises no questions about the nation-state as the essential organization for social life.

Foreign Policy Studies

Another approach to international education in the United States is to examine international activities in terms of foreign policy. As the title suggests, this approach tends to accept United States' interests as basic and to perceive other nations as foreign. The concern is to understand policy developments and consequences in relation to American intentions or expectations. Foreign policy study does not automatically take a pro-U.S. stance; sometimes U.S. policy on tariffs or U.N. interchanges are brought under scrutiny, but the main theme of national protectionism remains.

Area Studies

Area studies have some popularity in elementary and secondary schools in the U.S., and considerable interest in higher education. Its focus, of course, is on geographic regions which share some topographic, cultural or political commonality. Thus, area studies can include such titles as Latin American Studies, Asian Studies, Atlantic Community, Development Education and Sub-Sahara African Studies. Current interest in Western Australia for the development of Indian Ocean Studies is a good example of this approach. Area Studies offer study of some topics which transcend national boundaries, like language and culture, trade, communication and religions. This approach also allows consideration of problems of the region, of possible alternative solutions, and of trans-national implications. Divergent views of society can be examined in a setting which does not require that one national view always wins. Thus, global issues like pollution, food and population, the armaments race and industrialization can be studied as they are related to regional interests.

Although it is certainly possible to teach area studies from a nationalistic orientation, similar to comparative studies, an honest assessment of the concept of area studies would mitigate against such a one-sided approach. Because its emphasis is on certain common features among nations, while respecting and examining differences, area studies can be used to dampen the uncritical nationalistic zeal that often informs other social studies structures.

Global or World Studies

Global education is a term widely used in the United States, and it is generally advocated, but in practice it often means one of the preceding curricular approaches rather than a global or systemic orientation. Global education, in any view, should focus on those issues and values which face an increasingly global village. This certainly would not ignore nation-states and their political economies; indeed the reality of global studies is that nations exist and their political economies are responsible for and responsive to these global issues and values.

Global education, however, would not be limited to the study of nation-states. Values like peace, human rights, ecological balance, political participation and economic well-being are recognized as problematic in the global setting. Topics which transcend national boundaries and which incorporate these values and divergent views would be part of global education. These topics include such things as pollution, hunger and the distribution of food, population, terrorism, imperialism, revolution, multinational corporations, egalitarian and elitistic trans-national movements, communication and transportation, industrialization and urbanization, and economic disparities.

Global education, as exemplified by work in World Order Studies or Global Perspectives, is also future oriented. Nation-states are not seen as the only means to resolution of global issues. Non-governmental organizations, differing global structures, and altered human perceptions of the world offer promise and problems for the future (Falk, 1975; Bertsch, 1982). Alternative views of a future world are understood as one means of reconsideration. The World Order Models Project is one research effort to provide knowledge in this regard. World Studies, a curriculum project developed by Robin Richardson in England, has a similar orientation, differing in its rejection of the social control implied by the term "world order" (Richardson, 1980). Global education requires a different sense of knowledge and values study than that exemplified in nationalistic education.

CONCLUSION: GLOBAL EDUCATION, NATIONALISTIC EDUCATION

Certainly, global education as defined in the last category above is much more controversial in the United States than the more popular forms of international study, which are considerably more compatible with the tradition of nationalistic citizenship education. Since the definition of social education posed earlier depends upon controversy, it is clear that global education is closer to social education than are the doctrinaire orientations of nationalistic education. For reasons enumerated earlier, and others, global studies are advocated but not widely practiced in American schools. There is recognition of a need to educate youth for life in a global society, but the strength of nationalistic traditions restrains the open exploration of global problems and ideas.

There is some hope in the increasing interest in global education, however, even if through nationalistic lenses. Changes in the perceptions of narrow national interest can come to incorporate regional and global interests (Rollason, 1981; Taylor & Thrift, 1982). Social education, defined as critical thinking about controversial issues, has an obvious responsibility here. This has repercussions and implications for curriculum development, teaching materials, teacher education and academic freedom in the U.S. It also has implications for social education in other parts of the world. A worldwide development in global studies for youth could provide avenues for increased understanding and human improvements.

As suggested at the beginning of this paper, definitions and rationales are important. There is a difference between education about nations and nationalistic education. In social education it is presumed that one would study about nations and their interactions with a level of skeptical inquiry; nationalistic education, however, presumes the inculcation of prescribed patriotic views.

There is also a difference between education about nations and global education. Education about nations can be limited to the perspective of nation-states, even with skeptical inquiry; global education, however, involves not only study of nation-states but also of issues which go beyond them. The difference, therefore, between nationalistic education and global education is vast. It is a difference not only in technical definition of terms, but also in underlying rationales, views of what constitutes knowledge, and purposes for education. Can we train people to have uncritical loyalty to a nation and then expect them to feel a civic responsibility for global issues?

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Chapter 2

NATIONAL INITIATIVES IN SOCIAL EDUCATION IN AUSTRALIA

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The assumptions underlying the title of this chapter are important ones requiring clarification. Specifically, three broad questions need to be addressed:

- In the context of Australian education, what is meant by "national"?
- In the same context, what can be classified as an "initiative"?
- What is meant by "social education"?

These questions are addressed before going on to describe some specific programs currently in operation and to suggest some future directions that national efforts in social education might take.

KEY QUESTIONS

What is Meant by the Term "National" in the Context of Australian Education?

There has been a tendency in the past to equate "national" with those initiatives that have come from the Federal Government. The implication has been that whatever the Federal Government initiates represents a "national" effort or an effort on behalf of all Australian citizens. Yet the legislative basis of education in Australia is such that, when the terminology is applied to educational efforts of Federal Government, it can be interpreted as overriding the constitutional provision that education is the preserve of the States rather than the Commonwealth. In this sense, "national" becomes an exclusive term rather than an inclusive one and has the potential to fracture rather than to bring together those concerned with education in Australia.

It is for this reason that one writer recently suggested another interpretation of "national" based on the notion of partnerships (Tannock, 1984). He has argued that national efforts in education should be those in which the Commonwealth and the States join together to achieve mutually agreed upon goals. Such a concept clearly has political advantages in an area that has witnessed disagreements over sovereignty. Yet the concept of partnerships also has very respectable curriculum precedents in the work of Schwab (1969) and Walker (1971). They have argued that deliberation should characterize debate about curriculum issues so that alternatives can be explored and assessed and decisions can be based on shared meanings and agreed directions.

Thus "national" is best seen as a partnership relationship between contracting systems (the Commonwealth, States and non-government authorities) rather than the imposition of an initiative by the Commonwealth on an unwilling State or education authority. The partnership is arrived at through negotiation and deliberation so that the objectives of all groups can be met legitimately. In this way ownership of the initiative can be shared by the partners and commitment to its implementation can be guaranteed.

What is an Initiative With in a National Context?

Given the immense resources of State Education Departments for curriculum initiatives, it has always seemed futile for the Commonwealth to attempt to compete with these. What is more, such competition would serve to undermine any partnership relationship and would eat up resources with no guarantees that the States would take up the products. Thus, over the past twelve months, the Curriculum Development Centre has adopted an alternative approach to stimulating national initiatives. It is based on the assumption that within the state and non-government systems of education there exists a pool of validated curriculum practices that have demonstrated their value in local school contexts and classrooms. If there is sufficient interest in such initiatives from other systems, then the role of the Curriculum Development Centre is to make the local initiative available on a national basis. Thus an alternative does not have to be something entirely new; rather it is something that has been developed and validated but is not currently available to all systems.

A good example of such an initiative is the Early Literacy Inservice Course (ELIC). Developed in South Australia from a New Zealand model, the course clearly demonstrated its worth in the local context. A great deal of interstate interest was shown in the course and the Curriculum Development Centre arranged for States to indicate their level of support by calling representatives together for national discussions. The majority of States were of the view that ELIC could be used outside South Australia and, so, the Curriculum Development Centre undertook to make it available nationally by providing a national coordination team and funding national training workshops. As a result, ELIC is now being used in every Australian state as a means of training teachers to improve their classroom practices in the vital area of literacy.

What is Social Education?

This is a more difficult question than the others since there is such a breadth of conflicting opinion both in the literature and at the level of practice. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Kennedy, 1979), I would want to tie social education to more traditional notions of social studies education. What this means, above all, is that social education is concerned with people, the views they hold of themselves and their culture, and the interactions they have with each other and with their environment. In all this there is a concern for the past, the present and the future.

Given this view, it is of some interest to compare social education with other school subjects. Very few subjects deal with the personal and the individual — they are more likely to be rather abstract and removed from reality. Social education on the other hand brings people into touch with themselves and their culture and this is its distinctiveness. It is people centred and, unlike other subjects, provides the opportunity for students to explore themselves, people around them and the way that those people influence the physical world.

Having set the background, discussion now turns to some current social education initiatives of the Curriculum Development Centre that can be characterized as "national" in character. These initiatives range across a number of program areas.

CURRENT INITIATIVES

Aboriginal Education

Aboriginal education is a priority area for the Curriculum Development Centre and currently there are three major projects at different stages of development. The Aboriginal Oral Histories project involves the development of a set of resource materials based on Aboriginal oral historical accounts of traditional and contemporary stories from the Kimberleys area of Western Australia. A complementary project to this one is the Furneaux Islands Project. While the project focuses on a particular aboriginal community in Tasmania, it also provides a model for the development of case studies of any contemporary aboriginal community. Through the use of video, the project will show that Tasmanian aborigines still exist and have a unique link with their tribal ancestors through the gathering of the mutton bird. A third project nearing completion is Aboriginality and Identity. Its purpose is to demonstrate that many urban and rural Aborigines have a deep sense of aboriginality and cultural identity. It will use video to show Aboriginal people speaking about their identification with and understanding of aboriginality, what it means to them and how it affects their lives.

Peace Education

Peace education is an emerging area of curriculum interest in a number of Australian education systems. The Curriculum Development Centre's project has been undertaken at the request of two systemic education authorities. Its purpose is to survey the current status and practice relating to peace education, undertake field work to identify initiatives taken by teachers and schools, analyse the data arising from the fieldwork and prepare a report to make recommendations for future development.

Geography and Economics Resource Pack

This project is in the process of developing a software/courseware simulation package on the theme of industrial locations and the decision-making processes associated with locating a particular industry or business. It is being modelled so that students will be assisted to investigate optimal locations. The project is part of a larger Information Technology in the Curriculum Program.

Australian Studies School project

This is a research and development project designed to provide information about the current state of "Australian" content in school curricula and to develop specific materials in response to identified areas of need. While the project will involve surveying all curriculum areas, it is expected that the social studies will receive special emphasis.

Pacific Circle Consortium Projects

The Pacific Circle Consortium is a loose confederation of OECD countries that are located geographically around the rim of the Pacific Ocean (New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Canada and the United States). The Curriculum Development Centre's membership of the Pacific Circle Consortium is an indication of the international obligations of a national agency. Yet the national character of the activities are not lost since a number of state Education Departments are also members. The main activity of the group has been development of materials based on themes of mutual interest. Three main projects are in various stages of development : the Ocean Project is developing materials on the wise use of Pacific Ocean resources; Harvesting the Ocean is a completed project focusing on conservation issues in the Pacific region; and the Antarctic Project takes up a number of themes related to the exploration and discovery of Antarctica and the Antarctic environment.

In summary, current national initiatives in social education can be classified as either investigatory in nature (for example, peace education and Australian Studies) or materials development projects across a broad range of areas (aboriginal education, software development and Pacific Circle activities). In addition, the Curriculum Development Centre advises other Commonwealth government departments involved in developing materials for school use. Currently these include the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs which is developing a kit on population issues, the Departments of the House of Representatives and the Senate which are developing a kit on the operation of the Federal Parliament, the Human Rights Commission which has a broadly based education program, the Electoral Commission which is in the process of establishing an Electoral Education Program and the Schools Liaison Network of the Australian Bicentennial Authority. These activities cannot always be termed "national" since not all of them involve close cooperation with State education authorities. Nevertheless, they give some indication of the range of activities at the Commonwealth level.

Two main points can be made about both national and Commonwealth activities. First, national initiatives in social education resemble a mosaic — the individual pieces are important and when put together the effect is impressive. Yet there is not a great deal of integration and there is no common theme driving the activities. For example, little thought has been given to a K-12 framework for social education or how to contribute to existing frameworks at the State level. Yet given the fate of previous efforts such as the Social Education Materials Project, perhaps integrated approaches are not the most productive way to go. Nevertheless, it would seem that a well-articulated policy context that could meet the needs of all partners in a national endeavour might be useful in framing future initiatives.

Second, the range of activities, both national and Commonwealth, indicates the diversity of social education. It can be approached from the point of view of social science disciplines, themes and concepts, and issues and topics or it can centre on individuals and personalities. In this sense it is unlike other school subjects where the parameters are fairly tightly drawn. Perhaps more than any other subject, social studies has the potential to be inclusive of the experiences of all Australians so that its diversity might be its strength.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Having described current initiatives of the Curriculum Development Centre as well as some projects initiated by the previous Centre, it seems important now to reflect on what the future might hold. What might guide decision-making in the development of a future policy for social education? I believe that there are three broad issues (and I should point out that these are my views and not necessarily those of the Curriculum Development Centre or its Council).

Content Versus Learning Processes

In the past two decades there has been a considerable emphasis on the importance of learning processes in subjects like mathematics, science, language and social studies. The argument has been that once learning processes have been mastered then students are able to direct their own learning across a broad range of content. Much credence was given to this approach through the concept of "information explosion" whereby it was argued that there were too many facts for any individual to master and therefore students needed skills to equip them to process the massive amounts of information that would come their way.

It is difficult to argue with this approach in terms of its logic. Yet one consequence in terms of Australian curriculum practice has been to downgrade the importance of specific content in order to promote the teaching and learning of skills. Skills learning is not content-free but in practice it has often been argued that it does not matter what content you use as long as students learn the required skills. Yet this begs the question of whether or not there is some content to which all students ought to have access. For example it would seem essential that minority groups such as aborigines, migrants and women be given access to the experiences of their groups over time as well as at the present time. In a sense, this has been recognized in the present Western Australian social studies syllabus where the history of Western Australia is said to be an essential part of the Year 5 course; its purpose is to give Western Australians access to their past.

For the future, then, it would seem important to work towards an inclusive social education curriculum that takes account of the needs and interests of all Australian students. For this to happen it will be necessary to refocus our attention on significant social content in the curriculum — content that will not exclude groups and individuals as though they have no place in Australia's past, present or future.

Common Curriculum

If content is considered to be an important issue for social education, then so too is the notion of common curriculum. At its crudest, the question of common curriculum asks what should be the basic and essential content for all Australian students. At its most complex, it asks which content has the most potential for providing access to culture and power in Australian society. It is futile, of course, to believe that curriculum content alone can achieve such an important outcome, yet it must play some role in determining the life chances of students. We should attempt to identify basic content and attempt the process of integrating it into our social education activities so that high quality social education can be offered to all Australian students.

Post-Compulsory Curriculum and General Education

Social education in the post-compulsory curriculum has been dominated by external examinations and tertiary entrance requirements. With the changing nature of post-compulsory school populations because of increased retention rates, there is now a real need to shape social education for this sector of education. It is not too much to consider that what we are now facing is universal compulsory education for a K-12 school population. Thus rather than a piecemeal approach we should consider integrated K-12 social education curricula, with an emphasis on defining what should be basic and essential content for all students and on promoting inclusiveness across the curriculum. The emphasis in all this should be on a general education that will prepare students to make a contribution to the social, political and economic life of Australia.

How Might we Identify Exemplary Practice in Social Education

The undeniable fact about education in Australia is that educational practice resides at the school level and proceeds daily irrespective of the deliberations and decisions of policy makers. It is quite likely that there exists in the broader educational community a pool of exemplary curriculum and instructional practices in social education that could be of great benefit to other schools and in other contexts. Given the restrictive economic climate at the present time, one of our thrusts should be the identification of validated educational practices that have demonstrated their worth. Thus, rather than invest money in the untried and the untested, we could invest resources in the dissemination of workable practices from one site to another or from a single site to national implementation. As Crandall and Loucks (1983) have pointed out, this might not be as dramatic as the innovatory approaches of earlier days, but it would ground our activities in practice and highlight the idea that educational change can lead to substantial school improvement. At the same time, it would demonstrate some faith in the skills of teachers as curriculum and instructional leaders.

CONCLUSIONS

It seems clear that social education will remain a curriculum priority for Australian schools in the forseeable future. If, as this paper suggests, some emphasis is placed on the post-compulsory curriculum and the contribution that social education can make to it, then there will be a need also to examine social education at the earlier years of schooling as well. This will be particularly important given the moves of a number of States to re-examine their current organizational patterns in schools. In Queensland, for example, **Education 2000** clearly suggests that post-compulsory educational institutions might be established and in Tasmania there is thought of experimenting with K-4, 5-8, 9-12 organizational frameworks. These initiatives would require an entire re-thinking of social education curriculum and its organization.

A great deal of thought needs to be given to the content of an Australian social education curriculum. In particular, emphasis should be placed on the notion that Australia is a multicultural, multiracial society which contains diverse groups all of which have contributed to our present make-up and which represent an important part of our future. The "Australianness" of the curriculum should be framed within this context.

Above all, we must avoid the marginalization of social education. Currently, there is much debate about numeracy and literacy but we must assert that, while these are necessary conditions for a good education, they are not sufficient. Students also need to be socially literate — they need to understand themselves, their society and their environment. At the same time they must be able to see themselves in the broader international context. Not only must they know, but they must be able to value as well — to distinguish between sets of values and identify values that will guide them.

The potential agenda for social education is broad and there is plenty of scope for national initiatives. Any such initiative, however, must bring schools, systems and the Commonwealth together in a concerted effort. In partnership, we can achieve a great deal in the worthwhile endeavour of improving the quality of social education for all Australian students.

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Chapter 3

IMPLICATIONS OF THE BEAZLEY REPORT FOR SOCIAL EDUCATION IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA

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THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT OF SOCIAL EDUCATION

Educational literature abounds with versions of what social eduction is and why it should be a concern of schools. My personal concept of social education is that it is a goal of education. Social education transcends any single subject area, but some subjects have the potential to contribute much more to it than others. Social education includes knowledge about society and social processes and the attitudes, values and skills that enable individuals to function happily, creatively and constructively as citizens. I am aware that these thoughts need expansion and that questions relating to self esteem, empowerment and politics are not covered adequately. One such attempt to do so is included in **Social Education for the Eighties** (Social Education Association of Australia, 1984).

Social Education for the Eighties contains a description of social education as perceived by one group of educators. This publication, which aims to provide a national perspective, began as a response to the First National Conference of the Social Education Association of Australia (SEAA) held in Melbourne in 1982. At this Conference the need for a rationale for social education was clearly identified by Emeritus Professor W.F. Connell. Subsequently a statement providing directions for social education in Australia was presented at the Second National Conference of SEAA held in Brisbane in 1984. Appendix A quotes, in some length, the concept of social education provided in this document.

There are varied approaches to the teaching of social education in Australia. While these approaches are not mutually exclusive, they do represent alternate theoretical viewpoints in the area. Once again it is worth quoting from the **Social Education for the Eighties** document which provides a comprehensive listing of examples of these different approaches:

1. An approach to social learning which uses subjects such as history, geography and economics as the major basis for these studies. These subjects are instrumental in providing many useful social insights. They are also interesting in their own right.

2. A progressive, or humanistic, approach which is based on child centred and enquiry based theories, and is associated with the concept of the "social studies".

3. A "social science" approach which utilises concepts, methodologies and theories from the human sciences and draws them into integrated courses.

4. A civic and moral education orientation, which may have a strong basis in religious education, or in recent years has been concerned with different kinds of "values education".

5. An approach which emphasizes critical thinking, contemporary problems and controversial issues as the basis for course design, rather than subjects or disciplines.

6. Approaches which respond to current social concerns such as "development education", "peace studies", "living skills", "life roles", "environmental education", "multicultural education", "consumer education", "transition education", and "future studies".

7. Approaches, mainly at the senior level, which seek to introduce into the high school some of the relatively neglected human sciences such as political science, sociology, anthroplogy, psychology and legal studies.

8. An approach which places the main responsibility for social education on the home and religious institutions, and which is sensitive to schools overstepping their role in social education.

(Social Education Association of Australia, 1984, p. 1)

The same document goes on to point out that, while these alternative approaches to social education are highly valued, there is nonetheless the need to identify what is fundamental to social education. This is especially critical as we face a period of substantial social change in Australia. Among these changes are the changing structure of the Australian population and a recognition of its pluralistic nature; the changes in attitudes and beliefs towards religion, family and the role of women in society; the position of Australia in a changing world and attitudes towards the global issues of peace and environmental education; revolutionary changes in the economy and technology which have altered substantially life styles in Australia, and above all the knowledge explosion in the human sciences and the development of new understandings which have altered critically the parameters of social education. In Western Australia the Beazley Report, with its implications for the future of education in the State, has provided us with the opportunity to reassess our approaches to social education in our schools (Beazley, 1984).

SOCIAL EDUCATION AND THE BEAZLEY REPORT

My principal purpose is to discuss the implications of the Beazley (1984) recommendations for curriculum planners concerned with social education. In this context, I consider mainly the principal carriers of social education themes in the formal curriculum. Although all subjects and all teachers have the potential to contribute to social education, most of my comment is directed towards curriculum structures in social studies. Also included are some comments on the way that implementation of the Beazley curriculum organization might affect approaches to social education and the environment in which social education programs are delivered.

Firstly, it is useful to consider the scope of the Beazley Report. Its terms of reference were very broad and its 272 recommendations cover primary, secondary, TAFE and tertiary education. It deals with preservice and inservice teacher training, teacher supervision and promotion, student welfare and discipline, special groups in schools and community participation in school decision-making. A powerful set of recommendations is concerned with the secondary curriculum and profound changes will coccur over the next few years as these recommendations are implemented.

It is interesting to consider the weighting given to various themes in the recommendations. For instance there are : 21 recommendations mentioning literacy and numeracy; 16 relating to student welfare and discipline; 27 relating to teacher training; and 33 dealing with industrial concerns. But only three relate to individual self esteem, life skills and moral education. If one was inclined to be generous, it could be argued that the Beazley Report is a document that contains a deal of promise for social education. If one felt inclined another way, it could be argued that the text of the report promises much but the recommendations do not deliver on that promise. A holder of this view might go on to argue that the report assuages community concerns for standards in literacy and numeracy and does not address adequately the major social issues of our time. A very humane and forward-looking report has not identified with any precision the actions that need to be taken to upgrade social education programs in schools.

The major carriers of social education in the proposed Beazley curriculum seem likely to be found within the curriculum components labeled Personal and Vocational Education and Social Studies. In addition to these "carriers" which are given consideration in the remainder of this paper, Beazley argues for a number of across-the-curriculum themes giving emphasis to literacy, life skills, multiculturalism and environmental education. These should be developed where appropriate in all subjects. The recommendations relating to community participation in government school decision-making could give rise to a structure that could give considerable support to social education programs in schools.

The development of a Personal and Vocational Education syllabus was advocated in the Beazley Report as a major contribution to a relevant social education program. Since the publication of the report, there have been negotiations between concerned parties with vested interests, with the result that the present agglomeration of health education, home economics, business education and home handyman units seem a far cry from the syllabus foreshadowed in the Beazley Report. A great deal of work needs to be done before this curriculum component will have the coherence and structure required.

Social Studies is a more traditional area of the curriculum. Its objectives relate to the needs of individual students, to the development of societal understandings and to concepts drawn from the social sciences. The K-10 syllabus received the endorsement of the Beazley Committee and was described as a model that should be emulated. This integrated and developmental syllabus includes systematic development of inquiry skills, social processes and understandings about society. It also contains a strong emphasis on values education. Until 1985 it was compulsory for all students in government schools through Years K-10. In Years 8-10 social studies was taught to a class group by one teacher for some 240 minutes per week. There was a considerable amount of teacher freedom embodied in the syllabus.

The Beazley recommendations will lead to major changes, not all of which are positive. The social studies course now has to be organized into free-standing semester units that allow for considerable measures of student choice. The probable organization is that there will be a "core" course for all students that will occupy 160 minutes per week coupled with elective units of about 80 minutes per week. There is a 33 per cent reduction in the compulsory time spent on this subject.

The proposed structural changes pose many dilemmas for curriculum developers. What should comprise the compulsory core units? What should the elective studies be? How can the best elements of sequential development and integration be preserved in a more fragmented unit approach? Can the goals of social education, the goals of social science disciplines and the needs of individual students be reconciled in the new structure?

Preliminary thinking is that the core semester units to be taken by all students should contain all of that content that is regarded as essential social education including appropriate values education and skills development objectives. The elective semester units will be developed around a variety of themes and will cater for different student interests and abilities.

The five interlocking themes that provided an organizing base for the K-10 syllabus can be maintained throughout the Years K-7 but not throughout Years 8-10. The material for the core units will be drawn unevenly from these themes and new linkages and organizers will have to be explored. It appears that the structural integration that was achieved in the K-10 syllabus might not be achieved in the new framework. If integration and coherence are to be achieved, they will be achieved in different ways in classrooms by teachers and students.

Many other dilemmas exist. For instance, who should deliver social education programs in schools? Up until now, some would argue that teachers well-trained in social science related disciplines have been dealing with social education issues but seeing them as peripheral to their main purpose. Should teachers in future be specially trained to teach social education programs in different contexts? In these contexts how should social education programs be developed? How can we ensure that these programs will be delivered by appropriately trained and motivated teachers working with students in supportive environments? These remain as issues to be given attention by educators in Western Australia.

The Beazley Report offers some hope for social education. It opens the way so that questions can be asked about the sort of curriculum actions that need to be taken to improve the quality of social education in the formal and informal structures of schools. Whether the new structures will support the transmission of effective programs remains to be tested. At least we have the chance in the major shake-up caused by the Beazley Report to examine why the curriculum rituals of the past have precluded effective social education and to seek to improve the situation for the future.

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APPENDIX A

Towards a Concept of Social Education

Social education has as its focus of concern the interactions between individuals, social institutions and their cultural and natural environments. Such environments are located both spatially and historically and are subject to political and economic influences. Social education, however, is more than just a way of organising knowledge **about** social interaction. It is particularly concerned with assisting people to function effectively in social situations so that they have some influence on the world around them.

Social education is a broad term which covers various social learnings. By way of summary, and to illustrate basic processes we regard as fundamental to social learning, we suggest the following as a working description of social education.

Social education is the process by which people actively:

- *gain understandings of their social worlds which go beyond common sense;*
- *develop skills in relating to others; and as a result*
- *are better empowered to influence and change their immediate and wider worlds.*

Some underlying assumptions of this description of social education are:

Interdependence. The relationship between the individual and society is one of interdependence. People are born into, and take on, the character of existing social relationships and beliefs in the family and beyond. As they go about their lives people recreate both beliefs and behaviours.

Social change through people. "Society" is not perceived as fixed, functionalistic or deterministic, but is composed of people and is capable of being changed by people.

Intergration of knowledge. Social education involves the integration of the experiences of people with knowledge drawn from public traditions of social enquiry. Such integration should encompass possibilities for imagining ways in which societies and the lives of people might be different.

Future impact. Social education is concerned with the impact of technology and other changes of an ecological and social nature on personal and group futures.

Life-long learning. Social education involves all levels of education and is a life-long process.

Integrative, contrastive and comparative studies. Social education places a strong emphasis on the experiences of people in their social networks so that there is a continuing relationship between the social world and social education activities. In doing so, social education includes contrastive and comparative studies of other times and places.

Shared responsibilities. Social education is the responsibility of all members of society rather than the role of an elite of elders, experts or dominant power groups. Those professionally involved in social education, such as teachers of the social subjects, share their task with all interested people in society. Conversely members of society-at-large should not cast all responsibility for social education on schools and teachers.

The working description of social education and its assumptions are important for two reasons. Firstly, a conception of school as an integral part of society rather than as an adjunct to it is emphasised. Secondly, there is no one particular tradition of social education which is right and perfect for all time. There are various approaches which might prove their value.

(Taken from Social Education Association of Australia, 1984).

Chapter 4

CRITICAL ISSUES IN MORAL VALUES EDUCATION

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INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to establish the claim for moral eduction because it is an area of the curriculum which lacks conceptual clarity. But there is generally agreement in Australia that moral education should be included in the aims of education and this has been reaffirmed in recent years in such educational documents as **Core Curriculum for Australian Schools** (Skilbeck, 1980), **Teacher Education in Western Australia** (Vickery, 1980), **Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Education in Western Australia** (Beazley, 1984) and the **Social StudiesK-10 Syllubus** (Wells, 1981). Despite these many mentions, moral education appears only in the "hidden curriculum" and does not feature prominently in the day-to-day curriculum of the schools.

There are several reasons for this gap that exists between the aims of education and the practice of the schools. First, the reports which acknowledge moral education in their statements of educational aims tend to give it only a passing mention while concentrating on recommendations in other areas. The Beazley Report, for example, states that "limited time has prevented the Committee from examining this area fully". Then it suggests that moral education should be included in a catch-all subject categorized as Vocational and Personal Awareness. Later parts of the same Report back further away by stating that "while schools have a significant role to play in this area, the major responsibility for moral and social education rests with the family, with support from the various institutions within the community." The net effect of this treatment is to reveal an underlying perception that moral education has a low priority in the curriculum.

Second, though mentioned frequently in reports, moral education lacks clear definition. At times it is identified with a list of socially approved virtues, such as respect for life, excellence, integrity, honesty, tolerance, etc. (Social Studies K-10 Syllabus). The list of virtues varies from source to source and their definitions are assumed. The Vickery Report places morality in a list of personal values along with honesty, integrity and good taste, thereby making morality nothing more than one personal value among others. The only thing clear from this is the confusion of meaning about values, virtues and morals. In addition there is a general recognition that critical thinking is an important part of moral education. This is often limited to the process of clarifying student's own values and judging alternative courses of action (K-10 Syllabus). The Core Curriculum document speaks of "critical analysis and reflective action", the Vickery Report mentions "development of a critical discrimination between good and bad", and the Beazley Report speaks of an "analytic understanding of the values, structures and institutions of the community . . . to discern true from false, right from wrong, and the ability not to be misled by propaganda and group pressure." In summary, the definitive educational documents have not clarified the relationships between virtues, values, morality and the intellectual processes of logical analysis and reasoned inquiry. The consequence is that it is very difficult to read these documents and come away with anything but a confused understanding of what moral education is supposed to be. Where there is no clarity of meaning, there is unlikely to be determined practice.

Third, moral education is caught in the competition for curriculum time along with an ever increasing list of things like vocational education, multicultural education, drug and alcohol education, environmental studies, peace studies, future studies, interpersonal relationships, sex education, consumer studies, computer education, education for leisure, etc. The list continues to grow as more and more issues surface in response to the pressures of pluralism and social change. Moral education tends to be pushed aside in the ensuing curriculum shuffle to keep up with current demands.

Fourth, moral education is potentially threatening to schools, teachers and education authorities because of its unfortunate association with controversial social issues. Democratic pluralism casts people into the adversarial roles of party politics, political pressure groups and opposing religious factions. While the fact of social conflict provides a most important rationale for some form of moral education in the schools, it also makes it a high risk area likely to bring forth conservative backlash. While there is no agreement in society about the rights and wrongs of many deeply moral issues, moral education will be perceived with suspicion by sections of the public and handled with reservations by those educators who have not yet developed a defensible philosophy for moral education.

DECIDING WHICH VALUES, IF ANY, SHOULD BE TAUGHT

Which values, if any, should be taught amidst pressure from absolutist groups for specific values and moderate groups for core values while avoiding the anti-intellectual value of indoctrination?

In democratic and pluralistic societies, it is inevitable that there will be a clash of values in the discussion of social issues and that this conflict, from time to time, will focus on what the public schools are teaching. In Australia we have seen this in pressure groups' attempts to influence curriculum change and this pressure is all the more fierce when people believe that the school curriculum is threatening their most cherished beliefs. So we have seen various conservative religious groups in some regions lobbying, from a position of moral absolutism, for the removal from the curriculum of such topics as evolution and sex education, especially information about contraception, Man: A Course of Study (MACOS) and Social Education Materials Package (SEMP), and for the inclusion of such things as daily prayers and Bible reading along with anti-abortion propaganda and values vaguely referred to as the Judaeo-Christian values. The appointment of some chaplains to schools is also a sign of these influences. More moderate groups reject the moral absolutism of the religious groups and call for the core values of society to be taught to provide moral fibre in order to protect youth from the evils of drugs, crime and certain kinds of alternate life style.

The basic approach is to perceive moral education within the "cultural transmission" idea of education. It is assumed that there is a body of belief and practice which characterizes a given culture and that the purpose of education is to transmit this to the young so that the culture is maintained. There are two problems with this approach to moral education: one is to isolate the values which in part define this cultural heritage and the other is to transmit them through education to pupils. In a pluralistic society, it is difficult to isolate the values which characterize the culture since there is little agreement in the culture itself. Some educators have attempted to list culturally relevant values or virtues such as honesty, truthfulness, loyalty, respect for persons and property, punctuality, industriousness, kindness, patriotism, thriftiness, faithfulness and so on. There is disagreement on some of them and conflicting claims for the inclusion of others. If consensus can be reached, this results in what has been called a "bag of virtues" (Kohlberg, 1981a), which hardly reflects the values of the culture because the need for consensus has reduced it to a short list compared to the longer list about which no agreement can be reached. So educators have had to settle for transmitting only some of the values in the cultural heritage.

Figure I shows a comparison of values/virtues found in curriculum guidelines in current use in Ontario, Canada (Wideman, 1983), Malaysia (Mukherjee, 1983) and Western Australia (Wells, 1981). Notice that no distinction is made between values (e.g., freedom, moderation), virtues (e.g., courage, honesty) and high order principles (e.g., respect for life, justice). All are lumped together and are assumed to be equally worthwhile educational goals.

At first glance the bag of virtues approach has great appeal. If the list is short and carefully selected, most people will approve of it and few would not want children to reflect such virtues in their character. However, we can raise a number of questions concerning moral education conceived of as character education. First, are virtues adequate descriptors of moral character? The Hartshorne and May (1928-30) studies pursued this question at great length. Formal character instruction was studied in schools, religious Sunday-schools and Boy Scout meetings. No correlation was found between any attempts to teach virtues or train character and moral behaviour. The authors were forced to conclude, against their predictions, that such basic virtues as honesty, truthfulness, altruism and self-control are not consistent character traits but situation-specific. On some occasions the subjects of their study displayed these virtues, but under different circumstances it was impossible to predict who would continue to reflect them. A further conclusion is that what is true for some virtues is true for them all. Moral education conceived as the inculcation of values and virtues is a failure. Why is this? A number of alternatives can be suggested. Virtues are not consistent character traits because some circumstances are too tempting (i.e., everyone has their price). This might be true but it doesn't negate the value of teaching virtues if by doing so we can help people become more virtuous (i.e., hold out longer against tempting circumstances than if no teaching were given).

A more compelling criticism is that virtues are inadequate definitions of morality since in certain situations they can be brought into conflict; for example, truthfulness could conflict with kindness, thriftiness could conflict with generosity, or respect for persons could conflict with patriotism. No-one can be expected to display all virtues simutaneously since situations can require trade-offs between them and, if all we have is a bag of virtues, how can we decide which trade-offs are more virtuous? Furthermore, teaching core values as virtues is at best socialization or at worst indoctrination. Both put the ends above the means and in doing so devalue intellectualism (i.e., the freedom of individuals to use rational means for judging the truth for themselves).

Peters (1981) describes the paradox of moral education: morality has its foundation in reason but children need morality long before they attain the capacity for reasoning. He speaks of developing

ONTARIO	MALAYSIA	WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Compassion	Compassion	Compassion
Cooperation	Cooperation	Cooperation
Courage	Courage	
Freedom	Freedom	
Honesty	Honesty	Honesty
Justice	Justice	Justice
Moderation	Moderation	
Respect for life		Respect for life
Respect for others	Respect	
Responsibility		Social/Responsibility
Tolerance		Tolerance
	Cleanliness/body	Excellence
	Cleanliness/mind	
	Integrity	Integrity
	Diligence	
	Gratitude	
	Humility/modesty	
	Self-reliance	
	Love	
	Public spiritedness	
	Rationality	

FIGURE 1. Comparison of Values/Virtues Found in Curriculum Guidelines

moral habits in the young to provide them with "language" for the later growth of reason. A good case can be made for the socialization of children on the grounds that it is necessary for their protection and social well-being that they learn certain socially approved rules of behaviour (e.g., a number of don'ts such as "don't play on the road", "don't speak to strangers", "don't accept a ride in a car without your parents' say-so", and "don't play with matches"). Then there are the do's such as "obey your parents and teachers", "always remember to say please and thank you", "be kind to others", "wash your hands before eating", etc. The formation of good habits is in most cases justifiable socialization. It falls far short of what could be called moral education because it precedes the age of reason and informed choice. It is severely limited when children encounter situations where rules conflict, and it has to be continually supported by extrinsic reinforcement. When children are capable of comprehending the reasons for rules and social graces, such reasons should be given so that a rational bridge is built between socialization and the moral education that meets with it on the positive side of the age of reason. In this way we provide rules and habits to protect children when they are most vulnerable but relinquish our authoritarian role as they develop competence in reasoning so as to facilitate the intellectual criteria required by and implied in the term "moral education".

THE FALLACY OF MORAL RELATIVISM

Perhaps the most powerful criticism of the bag of virtues approach, and the cultural transmission idea on which it is based, is that it fails to make the distinction between cultural relativity and moral relativity. There is a well entrenched belief among many sociologists, who have been influenced greatly by Durkheim (1961), that all moral beliefs are learned from the culture and are culturally relative. Morality is inadequately defined as respect for the norms of the group. It is assumed that what is moral in one society cannot be judged right or wrong by the norms of another group or society. This position fails to make the distinction between group norms and universal moral principles. To tie moral education to a culturally conditioned bag of virtues is to open the door to the fallacy of moral relativism. This leads to such absurd statements as "All are equally right if they adhere to the beliefs of their group" and "Because we come from different backgrounds, what is right for you might not be right for me." The absurdity of these statements becomes apparent when we realize that they make it acceptable to say that the Nazis were right in exterminating six million Jews because they were adhering to the norms of their group. Similarly, moral relativism makes it impossible to distinguish between Martin Luther King and his assasin since each was acting out of firmly believed group norms. Clearly, the value relativity position is not morally acceptable or philosophically sound. There is something more to morality than a culturally conditioned bag of virtues, however these are conceived. That "something more" must meet the criterion of universalizability: it must provide us with a way of deciding what is right when there is conflict between cultural norms and when lesser values and virtues can offer no guidance.

Another popular approach is to perceive moral education as teaching the skills of rational decision-making. This is a vast improvement on the inculcation of a bag of virtues because it recognizes the inherent conflict between values in given situations and seeks to build the moral education curriculum around finding rational solutions to these conflicts. However, the process of Values Clarification and Analysis (Raths, Harmin & Simon, 1966), which is so often chosen by curriculum developers (including the K-10 Social Studies Syllabus in Western Australia) to implement rational decision-making, embraces the fallacy of moral relativism. Values Clarification and Analysis assumes that what is morally right is found by each individual searching out the facts and choosing between alternatives after weighing the perceived consequences of acting on each one. There is nothing in this approach to distinguish individual interest, tastes, likes and dislikes from social ideal and universal moral principles. All choices are reduced to a matter of personal taste or mere opinion. So long as the individual does the choosing and weighing according to his/her own values, they are presumed to be right. Teachers are cautioned to foster a non-judgemental atmosphere in the classroom so that students can be free to clarify their own values, analyse the values of others and make justifiable decisions. While an atmosphere of freedom is important for a rational decision-making model, there is no provision in this method for questioning the criteria by which decisions are justified. The process is so superficial and open that any number of outcomes are possible. Individuals might justify their decisions on the basis of self-interest, positions of entrenched prejudice or naive idealism. The subtle presence of peer group pressure can coerce adherance to popular views and the analysis of consequences can promote a form of amoral pragmatism in which outcomes (e.g., dropping the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or waging a war in Vietnam) are chosen because they seem likely to succeed not because they are judged morally right. Despite the substantial criticisms levelled at Values Clarification and Analysis (Stewart, 1976; Lockwood, 1976; Wehlage & Lockwood, 1976; Fraenkel, 1977), it still occupies a central place in some moral education curricula (Partington, 1984).

COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO MORAL EDUCATION

The cognitive developmental approach to moral education is based on Kohlberg's (1969, 1975, 1981b) six-stage theory of moral development. Kohlberg describes his stage theory as a naturally occurring process of moral development which takes place in response to cognitive stimulation. The individual encounters situations and arguments which reveal the limitations of his/her own moral reasoning and

this stimulation causes a re-evaluation which could lead to a Piagetian-type accommodation of thought resulting in a qualitatively new form of cognitive structuring that more adequately deals with the situation. The developmental process involves movement through an invariant sequence of stages beginning in the pre-conventional egoistic stages typical of the young child, then into the conventional stages of discovering group norms and the authoritative rules of society, and finally into post-conventional stages which recognize democratic social contract and, ultimately, universal moral principles (see Appendix A). This sequence of stage development, while invariant in its order, is not inevitable since few people develop unaided beyond the conventional stages.

Kohlberg's theory is both a psychological theory of how people develop moral reasoning and a philosophical theory of why higher stages are more adequate (Kohlberg, 1981b). The theory sparked great interest among educators and, over a decade ago, there was an initial bandwagon effect with many attempts to create teaching methods and materials for moral education interventions. This was unfortunate in that bandwagons tend to roll on under their own steam and get ahead of research in producing easy to use but superficial products. For example, the kind of moral dilemma stories which Kohlberg uses in his stage scoring instrument were adapted as the basis for class discussions. Books full of dilemma stories were printed with instructions on how teachers should use them, but with little thought about whether teachers were cognitively able to use them (Wilkins, 1980). The stories themselves were narrow in scope, over-simplifying the complexities that students would find in real life issues, and little thought was given to sequencing so that students would learn to handle greater complexity and abstraction as they progressed through the grades (Fraenkel, 1976). However, the bandwagon also had many good effects. It popularized Kohlberg's work, enabling many curriculum writers and teachers to grow in their experience with the theory and methods. Further, more widely-based research was stimulated in moral education interventions. All this resulted in extending the theory and improving its application both in the classroom and beyond.

Research has shown that class discussions of moral dilemma stories can produce moral stage development in adolescence at the conventional stages (Sprinthall & Mosher, 1979) but that, for development to post-conventional reasoning in later adolescence, real life conditions of responsibility are required (Kohlberg, 1973).

Kohlberg (1970) concluded that moral discussions in classrooms are limited in their effectiveness if the school ethos is authoritarian in nature. Research in Just-Community-Schools suggests that running a school along democratic lines with student participation in making the decisions which affect them is a more valid approach than restricting moral education to classroom discussions of aritifical dilemmas (Kohlberg et al., 1981). Curriculum developers should do their homework thoroughly by keeping abreast of the research before rushing in to fill the classrooms with educational plans and products.

Kohlberg's theory and research have a great deal to offer the moral educator. It makes the important distinction between form and content in moral reasoning. Moral education can be broken down into **universal form** of cognitive reasoning and **culturally specific content.** The form of moral reasoning is described by the six stages in Kohlberg's system through which an individual develops progressively more equilibrated forms of reciprocity and reversibility. The content of moral reasoning is the specific issue that is being judged and this could present itself as a personal moral dilemma or a larger public policy issue. Cross-cultural studies have shown that, although the content of morality differs from society to society, the forms of moral reasoning reflect the six cognitive stages (Kohlberg, 1983). For example, a stage two decision involving saving a wife's life by stealing a life-giving drug has the same cognitive form, although it could be made for different culturally-related reasons by persons of quite different cultures. A Malayan boy said he would steal the drug, reasoning that this would avoid the high cost of a funeral. Another boy in a different locality where funerals were not expensive reasoned that he would steal the drug because the wife was needed to do the cooking. Both boys relate the issue to different content but are operating from the stage (form) typed as egoistic hedonism.

The distinction between form and content is a giant breakthrough in that it allows us to define the objectives of moral education in a way that avoids the charge of trying to indoctrinate students with culturally specific answers to moral issues. It now becomes possible to develop a universal model of moral education that is defensible within the whole range of pluralistic, multicultural and cross-cultural situations.

The goal of moral education is to stimulate cognitive development through the stages of moral reasoning. The focus of that stimulation is not specific content about controversial moral issues. If it were, then we would be open to the charge of indoctrination. Rather the focus is on cognitive moral reasoning for which the specific content of a controversial moral issue is only the vehicle. The acceptance or rejection of specific moral content, for example, whether it is right or wrong to have an abortion, cannot become the objective in a moral education lesson without denying students their educationally valid right to judge the issue for themselves. But, without any objective at all, other than to acknowledge that right, moral relativism results. However, if the objective is to get students to test their arguments according to the adequacy of logic and cognitive moral structure, the two main objections to moral education, namely, indoctrination and relativism, are overcome.

Furthermore, by focusing on cognitive objectives, developmental moral education is supported by the cognitivist's claim that teaching ethical issues can be put on the same objective basis as other subjects, such as mathematics and science where truth is tested by the adequacy of logical reasoning and the possession of factual information (Scriven, 1976). However, the cognitivist notion of instruction in formal ethics can offer no guidelines about how to sequence and structure ethical knowledge so as to match the psychological development of students and create a valid curriculum. Developmental moral education adds moral stage theory which allows pupil readiness for types of moral reasoning to be assessed and optimum curriculum match to be accomplished. For example, because children between the ages of nine and twelve are maximally ready to move from the pre-conventional stages to the conventional stages, it makes educational sense to provide them with opportunities to make moral judgements that have to go beyond self-interest to take into account the interests of others and society. Adolescents already at stage three and beginning to enter stage four should be confronted with situations that show conflict between social conformity and society's laws and, for older adolescents, conflict between society's laws and the principles by which one can reason about the moral validity of laws (Sprinthall & Sprinthall, 1981). Once these ideas are grasped by curriculum writers, it will become possible for people of different cultures or cultural sub-groups to work cooperatively on a moral education curriculum and for moral education curricula to be developed for multi-cultural schools.

GUIDELINES FOR CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

Since there is a universal form for cognitive moral development, it becomes possible and desirable that curriculum teams with cross-cultural, even international, characteristics work cooperatively on the development of moral education curriculum designs. The ensuing dialogue and opportunities for perceptual role exchange among team members offers exciting prospects for mutual insights to be built into the curriculum.

Several guidelines for curriculum development are suggested by the theory of moral development. First, moral development tends to be age-related. As already mentioned above, stage theory enables pupil readiness for levels of moral reasoning to be assessed and generalized to age-related groups. Curriculum materials can be developed with specific age groups in mind based on optimum match between curriculum and pupil readiness. As age and cognitive stage change, so curriculum sequencing is arranged accordingly. It should be noted, however, that the curriculum does not guarantee moral stage change; rather it only provides opportunity for stage change to occur.

Second, moral development is described by an interactionist theory. It occurs through social interaction and cognitive stimulation. At each stage individuals have their own discrete cognitive structure which has to be thrown into disequilibrium by some challenge to its adequacy before equilibration at the next stage can take place. This happens when individuals encounter situations and arguments which show the limits of their current cognitive structure. In age-related groupings, students can be spread across two or three stages. This has educational advantages in that the reasoning of students at one stage can help students at the preceding stage meet the limits of their own reasoning and stimulate reaching for the next stage. Curriculum designs have to provide the conditions for this to happen. They have to produce moral dilemmas which can be genuinely experienced by students and which have the potential to stretch the limits of students' existing stage of reasoning. This has been done in the past by: presenting moral dilemma stories for discussion; role playing; public issue debating; and creating a democratic forum for making real decisions about issues that concern students. What can be created is limited only by the imagination of teachers and curriculum makers.

Third, the curriculum must allow for horizontal decalage to take place. People do not develop rapidly through the stages of moral reasoning. After entering a stage there is a period of stabilization when the newly developing perspective has to be applied across a wide range of thought. This process of horizontal decalage can span many months or several years and is necessary in order to fill up a stage so that eventually its outer limits can be tested. In providing this breadth of experience, the moral education curriculum should include opportunities to explore moral decisions in all areas appropriate to the student's life. This might cover personal dilemmas, interpersonal relations, peer group pressures, cross-cultural experiences, religious beliefs, social issues and so on. It is at the point of horizontal decalage that the moral education curriculum can be integrated with other parts of the curriculum, especially those subjects mentioned above which are in competition for curriculum time. Moral education, by concentrating on the cognitive form of moral reasoning, can create the cognitive competence to deal with real life issues arising in these areas with minimum exposure to their content. Many of these subjects, for example, vocational education, environmental studies, peace studies, future studies, alcohol and drug education, could have their important value components dealt with by the moral education curriculum thus reducing some of the pressure on curriculum time.

Fourth, cognitive development is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for moral education to occur. To the curriculum developer, this means that the moral education curriculum cannot be seen in isolation from what is being learned in the rest of the curriculum. If cognitive development is not given a high priority in the rest of the curriculum, that is, if rote memorization of content is emphasized,

greater difficulty will be encountered in the development of moral reasoning because of the lack of cognitive readiness among students. Teachers will also be less adept at information processing approaches to teaching. In such educationally backward situations, curriculum developers need not despair. Their task is not impossible, only bigger. They can show their colleagues in other areas of the curriculum the importance of making cognitive development a major aim of education. They can also find opportunities for building cognitive developmental experiences into the moral education curriculum, for example, by introducing students to logical reasoning and by employing inquiry methods for getting at relevant information prior to exploring the moral implications of social issues.

Fifth, to avoid the fallacy of moral relativism, the moral education curriculum should explicate the criteria by which moral judgements are tested. Coombs, Daniels and Wright (1980) identify the following four criteria which teachers should use to put test questions to students during moral education discussions: (1) the role exchange test asks students to consider their decisions and whether they would still hold to them if they had to exchange places with the most disadvantaged person in the case under discussion; (2) the universal consequences test asks students to consider the consequences of their decision if everyone were to act on it; (3) the new cases test applies the decision to other similar situations to see if the inherent principle in it is acceptable for all the judgements that it implies; (4) the subsumption test examines a value judgement to see if it follows from higher principles which are held to be important. If it violates one of these higher principles, then the value judgement is inadequate. There are many techniques that teachers can use in conducting moral education discussions. This means that inservice teacher training has to be planned and instructional manuals for teachers have to be produced.

Sixth, the hidden curriculum should support the moral education curriculum. Moral education classes will be perceived by students as phoney if the values and principles discovered there are not reflected in the whole life of the school. In addition, if the school ethos is rigidly authoritarian, then this tends to fix a stage-four ceiling to moral development. In order to raise this ceiling to permit post-conventional moral development, students in secondary schools should be given regular opportunities to participate in a democratic forum for deciding rules and other matters which concern them. Day-to-day issues raised by school life can become topics for individual class discussion and larger issues concerning the whole school can be brought to the school forum. The extent of student participation and the quality of open debate within the school are crucial parts of the moral education program.

Finally, moral decision-making is hollow if it is not fulfilled in appropriate action. Action within and outside the school should be encouraged. Students should be able to act on decisions made in school forums and should experience the consequences of their actions. The full cycle of discussion, decision, criterion testing, action, consequence and review provides optimum stimulation for moral development. Community action can also take place. Where moral education discussions raise concern for political issues, students can learn how to use the legitimate channels by which political pressures are brought to bear. For example, individual students can decide to write letters to newspapers and politicians or to circulate petitions. Other forms of action would include community service, such as fund raising for charity or giving aid and comfort to the sick, aged and poor. The moral education curriculum cannot remain academic and aloof but should flow naturally and logically into its applied forms. Curriculum makers must facilitate this movement from discussion to action by giving teachers and school administrators guidelines about how to define their roles and suggestions about how their respective roles can be fulfilled.

SUMMARY

I have argued in this paper that moral education is generally acknowledged as important in education, but poorly defined in that the relationships between tastes, values, virtues, morality and rational decision-making are not clearly delineated. This confusion is exacerbated by the social conflict inherent in a pluralist society and the pressure this exerts on the schools to include or exclude certain moral content in the curriculum. Attempts to deal with this conflict by conceptualizing moral education in terms of the cultural transmission of a set of core virtues cannot succeed because (1) there is little agreement about which virtues to teach, (2) research has shown that virtues are not stable aspects of moral character, (3) virtues are inadequate in themselves for resolving the conflicts which arise between them when making moral decisions, and (4) teaching specific virtues as values is indoctrination which denies the primary educational value of intellectualism. Furthermore, the cultural transmission approach fails to differentiate between cultural relativity and moral relativity, thus allowing the fallacy of moral relativism to permeate moral education curricula (e.g., as seen in the widespread adoption of Values Clarification and Analysis techniques). Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach provides a better conceptual framework for curriculum development in that it distinguishes between form and content in moral reasoning, thus making it possible to develop a universal model for moral education that is defensible within the whole range of pluralistic, multicultural and cross-cultural situations. By switching the emphasis away from moral content to cognitive form, the dangers of indoctrination on the one hand and moral relativism on the other hand are averted. Moral education can now be put on an objective basis with the added advantage that moral stage theory provides curriculum guidelines by which optimum match can be accomplished between the curriculum and the moral stage readiness of students. Finally, seven guidelines are suggested for developing the moral education curriculum.

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APPENDIX A

A THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Recent developments have produced teaching techniques based on Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Kohlberg's research in the United States, Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey and Yucatan led him to conclude that, despite wide differences in cultural background, people move through the same stages which are identified by the kind of moral reasoning that occurs at each one. Growth through these six stages follows a sequence which does not change, though it can be arrested at any stage short of full development. Kohlberg suggests that only ten per cent of adults in the United States develop to stages five and six. Descriptions of the six stages grouped into three levels representing their orientation to society are shown below:

Pre-Conventional

Stage 1: Avoidance of Punishment. Decisions stem from blind obedience to authority in an attempt to avoid punishment or gain reward. The perspective is self-centred and does not consider others or realize that the interests of others can differ from one's own.

Stage 2: Self Benefit. Being right is pursuing one's own interests as an individual, recognizing that others will do the same. Deals are made with others on the basis of fair exchange.

The perspective still centres on self but admits that others' interests are right for them. Others could be used as instruments of self-benefit and conflicts might be resolved through "back-scratching" deals or "getting even".

Conventional

Stage 3: Approval of Others. What is right is decided by what others will think; therefore, your behaviour tends to conform to what is expected of you in order to gain social approval. Conforming because of peer group pressure is typical.

The perspective has widened to see the self as belonging to social groups where mutal concern, trust, loyalty, and other interpersonal values generate expectations about right behaviour.

Stage 4: Maintenance of the Social Order. Doing right is having respect for authority, doing one's duty and observing rules for the sake of maintaining the social order. This is a "law and order" orientation.

The perspective goes beyond interpersonal agreement and group membership to take in society as a system which must be served and honoured without question.

Post-Conventional

Stage 5: The Democratic Social Contract. The laws of society are upheld because they have been freely entered into through democratic participation and exist for the good of all. Laws that no longer serve the good of all should be renegotiated. Private morality is left to personal choice and the rights of others are respected.

The perspective is of a society organized by rational individuals having respect for democratic values and the rights of others.

Stage 6: Morality is interpreted as a decision of conscience based on commitment to universal ethical principles such as justice, equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of each human being.

The perspective is one of inner direction and rational application of universally valid moral principles.

(Reprinted from Wilkins, 1981)